Reforming mental disability law in Africa: practical tips and suggestions by Bartlett, Peter & Hamzic, Vanja
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 
REFORMING  
MENTAL  
DISABILITY  
LAW IN AFRICA:  
PRACTICAL  
TIPS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
 
 
 
By  
Peter                       
Bartlett  
and 
Vanja 
Hamzic 
  
2 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS, AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3 
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 3 
INTRODUCTION 4 
THINKING ABOUT SUBSTANCE:  WHAT DOES THE LAW HAVE TO COVER? 7 
FRAMEWORKS FOR LAW REFORM 7 
ISSUES SURROUNDING COMMUNITY SERVICES AND COMMUNITY LIVING 12 
ISSUES SURROUNDING HOSPITALISATION AND TREATMENT IN HOSPITAL 14 
THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS CONCERNING INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALISATION 14 
GOOD PRACTICE ISSUES RELATING TO INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALISATION 18 
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ON TREATMENT OF SERVICE USERS IN HOSPITAL 19 
TREATMENT OF INFORMAL INPATIENTS 21 
ISSUES SURROUNDING STANDARDS OF CARE IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS AND RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS 21 
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE RIGHT TO MAKE DECISIONS, AND MENTAL CAPACITY 23 
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26 
SOURCES AND DRAFTING PROCEDURES 27 
  
Table of Contents 
 
  
3 
 
About the Authors, and Acknowledgements 
 
This report is written by Peter Bartlett and Vanja Hamzic.  Professor Bartlett is Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS Trust Professor of Mental Health Law in the School of Law at the University of 
Nottingham.  He has served as consultant internationally on various projects concerning mental 
health law reform, most recently in Lesotho.  Mr Hamzic is a doctoral candidate in human rights law 
at King’s College London.   
The authors wish to thank the following individuals who agreed to be interviewed as part of the 
development of this report and/or commented on a draft of the report: 
Natalie Drew, World Health Organisation, Geneva 
Melvyn Freeman, psychologist and public health civil servant, Republic of South Africa and periodic 
WHO consultant regarding mental health law reform in Africa. 
Kris Gledhill, Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland. 
Rachel Jenkins, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College, London, United Kingdom 
Sylvester Katontoka, service user, president of the Mental Health Service Users Network, Zambia 
Julius Lutaakome Kayiira, Executive Director, Mental Health Uganda 
Joyce Kingori, Programme Manager, Basic Needs UK, Kenya. 
Eyong Mbuen, Policy and Advocacy Officer (Africa), Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC), 
Budapest. 
Abdul Maalik, Executive Director, Mind Freedom, Kenya. 
Alexander McLean, Executive Director, African Prisons Project. 
Moses Mulumba, lawyer, Uganda. 
Akwasi Osei, Director of Accra Psychiatric Hospital and Chief Psychiatrist of the Ghana Health Service 
Soumitra Pathare, psychiatrist, India.  
Moosa Salie, co-chair, World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, Cape Town.  
While the individuals were selected because of the affiliations noted, they were consulted in their 
personal capacity and the views they expressed are not necessarily those of their organisations.  
Further, while the authors are grateful to these individuals for their generous sharing of their ideas, 
the report does not necessarily represent the views of all individuals in all respects. 
Funding of this report, and of international involvement of Professor Bartlett, Dr Freeman, Dr 
Pathare, and Ms Drew in the Lesotho mental health law reform project, was generously funded by 
the Nuffield Foundation. 
A Note on Terminology 
 
Describing the people at issue in this report is complicated.  The traditional legal words, such as 
‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’, and ‘the mentally deficient’, are now, rightly, viewed as insulting and stigmatising.  
This report uses the phrase ‘people with mental disabilities’.  This is not perfect, as it is often taken 
to include only people with intellectual disabilities or learning difficulties.  That is not the intent here.  
It is intended to include in addition those people with psychosocial disorders or mental illnesses such 
as schizophrenia and depression.  Where appropriate, these people are also referred to as ‘service 
users’, acknowledging their role in the health care and social services systems. 
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Introduction 
 
61. The African Commission maintains that mentally disabled persons would like to share 
the same hopes, dreams and goals and have the same rights to pursue those hopes, 
dreams and goals just like any other human being. Like any other human being, mentally 
disabled persons or persons suffering from mental illnesses have a right to enjoy a decent 
life, as normal and full as possible, a right which lies at the heart of the right to human 
dignity. This right should be zealously guarded and forcefully protected by all States party 
to the African Charter in accordance with the well established principle that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. (Purohit and Moore v the Gambia, 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2003)  
The aspiration expressed by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the quotation 
above remains a distant hope for so many African people with mental disabilities.  At the same time, 
the world is becoming ever more aware of the needs and rights of people with mental disabilities:  
the age of ‘out of sight and out of mind’ is, joyously, increasingly a thing of the past.   Africa should 
be at the forefront of this movement.  It is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, after 
all, that includes a special provision in article 18(4), providing people with disabilities enhanced 
rights:  
18(4). The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection 
in keeping with their physical or moral needs.  
This express acknowledgement of the rights of disabled people not merely to be free from abuse 
and discrimination but to be entitled to services is unusual, and gives disability issues a particularly 
powerful place in African international law.  
Legal provisions are irrelevant, however, unless they are put into action.  Sadly, too frequently, this 
is not yet the case in Africa.  The facts in Purohit v the Gambia are all too typical:  legislation left over 
from the colonial era, with few if any of the rights and protections that are required by modern 
international law, coupled with minimal service provision based in an institutional setting.  The 
increasing frequency with which the WHO is asked by African governments to advise on legal and 
service reforms in Africa attests to a developing awareness of the need for change, but bringing 
about this change can be complicated in an African context.  In part, this flows from a relative lack of 
financial and professional resources:  health budgets are small, and there is generally very limited 
availability of medical and social services staff, community programmes and facilities.  It is also, 
however, that the legal changes require the governments, service users, service providers and 
others involved in  reforms to think about the care and treatment of service users in a much more 
developed legal framework than has been the case in the past.  For people without legal training, 
this means that an understanding of the basic relevant law is required; for lawyers, this means 
considering how legal doctrine applies for service users, a client group not generally considered in 
law school. 
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Some very good materials exist to assist in this – most notably the WHO resource book on mental 
health, human rights, and legislation, Stop Exclusion, Dare to Care (Geneva: WHO, 2005) (hereinafter 
referred to as the WHO Resource Book).  This resource book is available electronically,1 and hard 
copies are also available from WHO’s AFRO Office.2  While it is a wonderful asset, it has some 
problems as a first step into the world of mental disability legislation.  It runs to about 200 pages, 
and while the wealth of detail and ideas it provides are extremely helpful in approaching law reform 
in this area, it is somewhat daunting to people new to the field, who may find themselves lost in the 
detail.  It is also written for an audience that is world-wide.  While this is in part its strength, with its 
inclusion of examples of good practice from a wide variety of nations, it does mean that it does not 
have Africa particularly in mind.  Finally, it was written before the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities (hereinafter, the ‘CRPD’) came into effect, a limitation that 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
This report is intended to address this gap in the literature.  It is hoped that it will be helpful to all 
who are involved in legal reforms to mental disability legislation in sub-Saharan Africa.3  No legal 
background is assumed, and legal citations are kept to a minimum.  Similarly, medical knowledge is 
not assumed.  It is designed to sit alongside the other support materials, such as the WHO Resource 
Book, and cross-references to that source occur throughout the current text. 
The starting point for the report is to detail what is required of mental disability law under 
international law generally, and under the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights in 
particular.  It may well be appropriate for nations to go well beyond the minimum required by 
international law in designing their mental disability legislation, however, and to this end this report 
also gives pointers to good international practice when these are appropriate.  Even this is likely to 
be insufficient however as a comprehensive guide to legislative reform.  Legislators may well want to 
include provisions that reflect local conditions, and local approaches to care.  As long as these are 
consistent with the international law – and generally, they will be – this is fine.  As such, this report 
should be seen as a starting point, not a limitation. 
That said, the requirements of international law are binding on governments.  Certainly, we often 
hear that ‘rights are not absolute.’  The truth of that statement depends on what the statement is 
taken to mean.  Certainly, international law itself often allows for some flexibility as to how it is 
implemented.  The intention is that a workable system should be able to be developed. Thus 
international law contains a right to the best attainable standard of health.  Some flexibility is 
provided to countries as to how they will meet that obligation, so long as they meet it; and solutions 
in Africa may well look very different from solutions elsewhere in the world.  Further, the extent of 
some rights is subject to interpretation by the courts, and may indeed develop over time.  This is 
particularly significant for present purposes for two reasons.  First, the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is still relatively new, we cannot yet be entirely sure how it will rule on issues relating 
to mental disability.  While the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has existed for 
                                                          
1
 http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/legislation/policy/en/ (accessed 15 June 2010).  Available in 
English and French. 
2
 For hard copies, please contact Therese Agossou (agossout@who.int). 
3
 The report does not discuss the potential relevance of Sharia law in the Islamic countries of North Africa. 
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longer, it has said little so far about mental disability rights, apart from the Purohit case noted 
above.  The precise scope and approach of the Banjul Charter is therefore a matter of some 
speculation.  Second, the CRPD is also a new document, having come into effect only in 2008, and 
the UN body that will adjudicate on matters relevant to it has only just been established.  Once 
again, it is not yet clear how it will interpret the CRPD.  If the claim that ‘rights are not absolute’ is a 
reference to these uncertainties and flexibilities, it is uncontroversial. That said, it is not correct to 
say that conventions and treaties are mere ‘guidance’ to governments:  the instruments are 
international law, and international law is binding.  Increasingly, there are international courts and 
tribunals that hold nations to account for failure to meet their obligations.  Once the nation has 
signed and ratified a convention or treaty, there here is no room to ‘pick and choose’ which parts of 
the law will be implemented:  the convention or treaty is binding on the country.   
While it is not the place of this report to promote a specific set of values beyond the requirements of 
international law, a few overall comments about the direction of legislation and policy regarding 
service provision for people with mental disabilities may be helpful.  The overwhelming international 
consensus has long been that service users should be involved in the determination of what services 
will be provided to them, and the development of their treatment programmes.   Community 
alternatives to hospitalisation are preferred, and when compulsion has been required either for 
admission or for treatment, it has long been the position that it ought to be the least restrictive 
alternative available for the individual.   
The preference for community alternatives and non-coercion are now part of international law in 
countries that have ratified the CRPD.4   The CRPD further represents an ideological shift in 
international law relating to mental disability, however.  Where previous international law had 
viewed mental disability (here, as always in this report, with this term including both people subject 
to mental illness and people with intellectual disabilities) as within the province of the medical 
profession, the CRPD sees issues in terms of a general failure of society to accommodate people with 
disabilities (including people with mental disabilities), through the provision of appropriate social 
and legal supports.  Its terms are not about providing people with mental disabilities with a special 
regime to ensure that medical professionals can fix their disabilities; it is instead about building a 
society in which people with disabilities can live, even if they remain disabled.  Consistent with this, 
it provides not merely for a right to live in the community, but also for example rights to education, 
to political participation, to an adequate standard of living, and to participation in cultural and 
sporting activities.  This does not, of course, mean that medical support is excluded from the CRPD.  
The right to the best attainable standard of health is contained expressly in the convention, as article 
25, and many (most?) people with mental disabilities who have had contact with medical services 
view medical services as essential to their well-being.  Instead, it means that the focus of 
international law in the area has broadened well outside its previous scope of controlling hospital 
admissions, enforcing treatment, and ensuring minimal standards of institutional care. 
Legal compulsion – the police officer at the door, waving the Mental Health Act, for example – is not 
the only kind of compulsion.  Often, people with mental disabilities will be highly vulnerable because 
                                                          
4
 See, in particular, article 19.  A copy of the CRPD, and a list of the countries that have signed and ratified it, 
may be found at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150.   
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of the combination of their social and economic situation with their mental disability.  The result is 
that, even if not compelled by formal law, they may feel that they have no choice but to do what 
they are told.  A person with mental disability given an ultimatum by her family that she must go to 
hospital may feel she has no choice and enter a hospital ‘voluntarily’, particularly if she has lived 
with the family before that admission.  These enforced choices are also compulsion.  A ‘voluntary’ 
admission will not be perceived as voluntary by a service user, if there are in practice no options 
provided for that person.  The objective of a good statute and policy should be to minimise this 
compulsion as well, and to encourage real involvement and real choices for service users.  Certainly, 
African traditions provide for duties of individuals, service users included to their families, and these 
duties are indeed enshrined in Articles 27 and 29.  By these same articles, however, their family 
members owe corresponding duties to them, providing them where possible with non-institutional 
care.   
These new approaches provide particular possibilities for Africa.  Rates of care in hospitals and 
similar institutions are low in Africa, by international standards.  While the law must make provisions 
to ensure the well-being, dignity and appropriate care of persons in these institutions, strong 
communities, strong traditions of emphasising family relationships and minimal traditions of 
institutionalisation make Africa a promising site for community service development. 
Thinking About Substance:  What Does the Law have to 
Cover?  
Frameworks for Law Reform 
 
National law relating to people with mental disabilities is subject to the frameworks applicable to all 
laws.  It must, for example, be consistent with the national constitution of the legislating country.  
This is important not merely in the sense that any restrictions imposed on people with mental 
disabilities must be consistent with constitutional protections relating to legality, but also in the 
sense that people with mental disabilities have the same rights under national constitutions as other 
citizens do.  If the constitution provides the right to vote, for example, that applies equally to all 
citizens, including those with mental disabilities.  One of the key roles that mental health law often 
has is realising the rights that people with mental disabilities are supposed to have anyway, as 
citizens. 
Domestic law must also be consistent with international law.  The range of applicable international 
law in this area is described elsewhere,5 so this report will keep jurisprudential analysis of the 
various treaties and conventions to a minimum.  Nonetheless, there are a few concepts that are 
helpful to understanding how international law frameworks are to be understood. 
                                                          
5
 See E Rosenthal and C Sundram, ‘The Role of International Human Rights in National Mental Health 
Legislation’ (Geneva:  WHO, 2004).  Copes available at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/international_hr_in_national_mhlegislation.pdf (accessed 15 June 
2010); World Health Organisation, WHO Resource Book on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation 
(Geneva:  WHO, 2005).  Copies in English and French available at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/legislation/policy/en/ (accessed 15 June 2010). 
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International law relating to people with mental disabilities falls into two categories.  The first 
concerns rights and standards that must be met immediately for compliance with international law.  
These are generally matters relating to fundamental human rights and dignity, such as appropriate 
legal regulation of psychiatric admission and treatment.  While there is some flexibility as to how 
these standards are met, there is no flexibility as to whether they may be met:  they are required.  
Many (but not necessarily all) of these rights will be mirrored in national constitutions and bills of 
rights.  Such constitutions often contain, for example, rights to access courts, property rights, voting 
rights and the right to legal process prior to any deprivation of liberty.   
Many of the rights contained in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are of this 
immediate variety.  Of particular relevance in the mental health field are the following articles in 
that charter: 
 Equality before the law, and equal protection of the law (art 3), and the right to have ones 
cause heard by a court (art 7):  this will be relevant to the overall oversight of the courts on 
matters relating to mental disability.  In conjunction with the right to property (art 14) it 
affects issues surrounding guardianship, and the right of persons with mental disabilities to 
continue to make decisions about their lives and affairs 
 The right to life, and dignity of the person (art 4):  case law outside Africa has held that the 
right to life requires a full and independent investigation when a person with mental 
disabilities dies in custody.  This means a full investigation of the circumstances of the death 
by an independent official such as a judge or coroner, in a hearing to which the family of the 
deceased has a right to be present and to be represented by a lawyer.  Case law within 
Africa has held that the use of terms such as ‘lunatic’ to describe people with mental 
disabilities is a violation of the right to dignity under this article.6 
 Prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art 5):  this requires, 
among other things, that appropriate standards of care are in place in psychiatric hospitals 
and other mental health facilities 
 Right to liberty, and freedom from arbitrary detention (art 6):  in other jurisdictions, such a 
provision has required the introduction of proper criteria and processes for compulsory 
psychiatric admissions.  The African Commission7 shied away from this approach in Purohit 
and Moore v the Gambia, holding that the section did not concern people in need of 
hospitalisation for medical reasons.  This is a surprising result, as the involuntary admission 
of an individual to a psychiatric facility, and the prevention of that individual leaving, would 
                                                          
6
 See Purohit v the Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001 (2003), para 59.  Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/241-2001.html (accessed 15 June 2010). 
7
 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
are both established by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  The Commission was created a 
number of years before the Court, and was for a number of years the only arbiter established by the Charter.  
It may still entertain complaints under the Charter, and in the event that it finds a complaint has merit, it may 
send it to the Court for consideration.  The decisions of the Court are, however, more authoritative than those 
of the Commission. 
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seem to be detention under any usual meaning of the word, and it has been found to be so 
under other conventions and similar legal documents.  It remains to be seen if the 
Commission’s approach will be upheld by the new African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.  The Commission did hold, however, that article 7, above, provides a right to an 
independent hearing into involuntary psychiatric admissions, and it is difficult to see how 
such a hearing can be effective without clear criteria. 
 The right to participation in government of the country (art 13).  This has been held by the 
African Commission to include the right to vote, with any departure from that right requiring 
objective and reasonable criteria.8  It presumably also includes the right to be a candidate 
for elections, and to hold government appointments when otherwise qualified to do so. 
All the rights in the African Charter are subject to a non-discrimination provision (art 2).  While this 
provision does not expressly mention disability, the categories of discrimination are not closed.  The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has already determined that the non-
discrimination provision is broad enough to include mental disability,9 and it is highly likely that the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights will do the same.  This seems particularly likely, given 
the express provision of the Charter that the disabled will be given special protection (art 18). 
The second category in international law concerns rights and standards that allow for ‘progressive 
realisation’.  The right to the best attainable standard of health provides a convenient example.  It is 
a right in international law, and its implementation must be taken seriously by states; but it is 
acknowledged that what constitutes the ‘best attainable standard of health’ will change over time, 
depending on local economic circumstances, developments in health sciences, and changes in social 
structures and conditions that affect public health.  The realisation of these rights may also involve 
the realignment of service delivery models, which may take time.  As such, the rights allowing for 
progressive realisation may be perceived as an ongoing journey – a journey that it is required for 
states to take, but one which, it is acknowledged, will be ongoing.  A number of rights in the African 
Charter are within this category, including the right to work, the right to health, and the right to 
education. 
The acknowledgment that progressive realisation may take time, and may be affected by economic 
and social realities, does not of course mean that governments can put implementation off until 
some future time.  The right exists, and governments are obliged now to do the best they can with 
the resources they have available.  The progressive element in implementation refers to the fact that 
some changes take time (e.g., training of teachers and nurses), and that economic circumstances 
may change, resulting in different possibilities for realisation.  It is not an argument for governments 
to do nothing now. 
                                                          
8
 See Purohit v the Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001 (2003), para 76.  Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/241-2001.html (accessed 15 June 2010). 
9 See Purohit v the Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001 (2003), para 54.  Available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/241-2001.html (accessed 15 June 2010). 
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A list of particularly significant rights in the current context, drawn from the African Charter and 
other relevant international law is contained in table 1: 
Table 1:  Rights relevant to Persons with Mental Disabilities in International and Pan-African Law 
 
Immediate Effect Progressive Realisation 
Appropriate procedural and substantive 
standards of detention, including right to 
challenge detention 
Right to health, habilitation and rehabilitation 
Appropriate procedural and substantive 
standards for compulsory treatment, including 
right to challenge such treatment 
Right to education 
A humane standard of care in hospitals and 
other institutional environments, including 
controls on restraint, seclusion and 
inappropriate medical treatment 
Right to community living, including right to 
reasonable housing and reasonable standard of 
life, right to work and employment, access to 
community services 
Equal recognition before the law, access to 
justice and appropriate an guardianship regime 
 
Right to privacy  
 
The rights above are to be applied without discrimination – men and women, and people of different 
ethnic or cultural backgrounds all benefit from them.  They also apply to children with mental 
disabilities and people with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system, although some 
differentiation is permitted in those cases to take account of the different contexts of those 
individuals.  
If we move from the realm of abstract rights into actual regulation, many issues appear in both 
columns.  The institutional standards that apply to psychiatric hospitals will serve as an example.  As 
table 1 notes, there is a threshold below which conditions in these hospitals may not fall.  Failure to 
provide adequate food, physical conditions, staffing, habilitative care and occupation for people 
detained in psychiatric hospitals can, if the deficiency is sufficiently great, constitute inhuman or 
degrading treatment under international law, and must be remedied immediately.  These matters 
will also be relevant to the right to health of people in these hospitals, however, a right which is 
subject to progressive realisation.  Even when conditions in a psychiatric hospital are not such as to 
constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, there is thus still a duty to look to improve them on an 
ongoing basis over time, as part of the attainment of the best available standard of health. 
Alongside these rights in international law are questions of good professional practice.  Often, these 
issues will intersect with rights subject to progressive realisation.  Thus good professional practice in 
the provision of community services for example will, obviously, intersect to a considerable degree 
with the right to the best attainable standard of health.  Sometimes good practice issues are in 
addition to minimum rights, however.  Thus many countries have found it desirable to introduce 
procedural safeguards prior to hospitalisation that are well in excess of the minimum requirements 
of international law.  Moving beyond human rights minimums is no doubt good.  As long as good 
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practice does not conflict with either domestic constitutional law or international law, it is of course 
desirable that the health care system adopt it and, where appropriate, introduce it into statute. 
The introduction of the CRPD throws something of a wild card into the international law.  It came 
into effect in 2008, and the committee formed to interpret it has only just begun meeting, so it is too 
early to say with precision what the specific terms of the CRPD mean.  A growing number of 
interpretations are coming forth.  It is a firm reaffirmation of the rights of people with disabilities, 
including mental disabilities, re-enforcing that they have the rights granted to all other citizens in 
international law.  It further requires states to make all reasonable efforts to provide services which 
will make community life and community integration possible for people with disabilities, although 
the specifics of what that will mean in the context of people with mental disabilities is not yet clear.  
It is clear, however, that this convention continues and re-enforces the international trend away 
from reliance on hospital and domiciliary institutions such as large-scale settings, in favour of 
normalisation of the lives of people with disabilities through the provision of community-based 
alternatives. 
All of this raises fundamental questions about how to proceed with law reform.  Some aspects of 
what is discussed above and in the remainder of this section will be sensible to include in a statute 
that is specific to mental disability issues.  Issues regarding hospitalisation are perhaps a clear 
example of this.  Other aspects may be better dealt with by amending other legislation.  It may well 
be for example that ensuring appropriate voting rights for people with mental disabilities is best 
accomplished by amending the elections statute, or provision of social services and housing through 
amending social services or housing legislation.  Other aspects may not be appropriate to a statute 
at all, and belong in other policy-related documents.  Statute law can establish the legal duties of 
people, but it does not increase the economic resources of a country, and targets for the scale of 
service provision may therefore be better left outside statute law.  Statute law can, however, create 
monitoring bodies to keep track of progress on policy issues, and to apply appropriate pressures 
when those policy developments stall.  As many of these non-statutory policies may be essential to 
improving the lives of people with mental disabilities and to implementing the right to health, these 
bodies should be viewed as an important part of the statute law. 
Further, laws are irrelevant unless they are properly implemented.  Far too frequently in African 
countries, mental health laws – some good, some not so good – are simply not put into practice. 
While the minimum standards of international law and the African Charter must be met, beyond this 
a realistic assessment must be made as to what can practically be accomplished in the law.  To this 
end, the substantive part of the discussion that follows endeavours to provide an indication both of 
the minimum that international law requires, as well as good practice beyond this standard.  While 
better practice is obviously preferable, actually implementing the minimum standard, or something 
between the minimum standard and best practice, is almost certainly better than legislating but 
failing to implement high standards.  A plan for implementation should be commenced concurrently 
with the legislative drafting process. 
All this means that drafting a new law must not be viewed in isolation.  It is part of a larger 
programme of planning, involving consideration of the direction in which the mental health service 
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in general should move, how the law fits in with that overall direction, and how the whole business 
can be implemented. 
Issues Surrounding Community Services and Community Living 
 
As noted elsewhere in this report, the overwhelming consensus in international practice, now 
articulated in Article 19 of the CRPD, is towards a move away from a focus on institutions, and 
towards care in community settings.  There are a variety of reasons for this.  Some of these are 
economic:  the consensus would appear to be that better health outcomes for more people are 
possible through the provision of good community services than through large institutions.  Some of 
these are human:  institutionalisation drives a wedge between the service user and his or her 
community, creating problems of re-integration at the end of a hospital admission; and community 
living appears to be preferred to institutionalisation by the vast majority of service users.  When a 
service user can be cared for in his or her community, therefore, it is almost certainly preferable to 
institutionalisation, and the object of mental health policy should therefore be to make these 
community options practically possible for as many service users as possible. 
These community-based rights are likely to be particularly important in Africa.  Statistically, Africa 
has a low rate of psychiatric hospitalisation by international standards, and thus presumably a 
correspondingly high prevalence of people with mental disability in the community.  This gives 
African countries an important set of possibilities for exemplary community-based care, but also 
makes the provision of community-based services of vital importance. 
As noted above, the CRPD approach is not merely to provide clinical services and housing in the 
community, although that is of course important.  The expectation from the CRPD is that legal and 
social programmes will be put in place to allow people with mental disabilities to become part of the 
community in which they live.  The CRPD includes not merely a right to health care (art 25), but 
rights to personal mobility (art 20), to privacy (art 22), to the home and to family life, including 
reproductive rights (art 23), to education (art 24), to work and employment (art 27), to an adequate 
standard of living and social protection (art 28), to participation in public and political live (art 29), 
and to participation in culture, recreation, leisure activities and sports (art 30).   
In many countries, including many countries in Africa, services for people with mental disability have 
been synonymous with hospital and other medical care.  The CRPD approach will require a 
significant change of thinking.  One result will involve a change in political practice:  as mental 
disability law is no longer only a medical matter, compliance with the CRPD will no longer be the 
exclusive preserve of health departments.  Laws which restrict employment rights of persons with 
mental disabilities, for example, will need to be changed; that will be the responsibility of 
Departments of Labour.  Meaningful provision must be made to ensure proper education of people 
with mental disabilities; that will be the responsibility of Departments of Education.  And proper 
procedures will be necessary to ensure that persons with mental disability can vote; that will be the 
responsibility of the electoral authorities.   
There is little in international law that determines standards of community care that must be met 
with immediate effect.  Certainly, care provided in the community must not be cruel, inhuman, or 
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degrading.  This provides something of a floor to community services.  The state must, for example, 
intervene in the event that it becomes aware of people with mental disabilities being subject to 
physical or emotional abuse, as it would intervene to protect other citizens in these circumstances.  
Similarly, as discussed in more detail below, appropriate law must be put in place to govern the 
restriction of any rights based on a lack of mental capacity.  Service users living in the community 
also enjoy the rights of any other citizens under international law, including rights to privacy, to free 
expression, to marry and found a family, to vote, and the right to dignity of the person.  These are 
classic political rights, and states must ensure compliance with immediate effect.  The best advice at 
this time is that the right to non-discrimination in legislative provision is also, generally, immediately 
realisable.  Thus even if the provision of specific employment programmes may be subject to 
progressive realisation, a law which precludes people with mental disabilities from working (eg., 
because they are subject to a restriction imposed by a guardianship regime) must probably be 
changed with immediate effect. 
Many other rights relating to life in the community and rights to community services are subject to 
progressive realisation:  while states must work to implement these rights, it is acknowledged that 
this is an ongoing process, and is, pivotally for much of Africa, subject to economic realities.  
Included in this basket of rights, are the right to education, to work and employment, to an adequate 
standard of living and social protection, and to participation in culture, recreation, leisure activities 
and sports.  In all these cases, what is subject to progressive realisation is the provision of specific 
services.  Laws which discriminate against people with mental disabilities, as noted above, are 
probably subject to enforcement with immediate effect.  By way of example, a law that says people 
with mental disabilities cannot apply for social housing must be changed immediately; programmes 
to provide social housing specifically catering to people with mental disabilities are subject to 
progressive realisation.   
A discussion of what constitutes good community services is outside the scope of this report, but by 
way of illustration, such services may require a variety of public health measures, proper housing, 
employment programmes, educational opportunities, social assistance and networks of good 
medical treatment.  In essence, what is called for are meaningful programmes that will assist people 
with mental disabilities in becoming or remaining integrated with their communities.  Local culture 
may well prove of particular importance in designing successful programmes.  As such, distinctively 
African solutions may be appropriate.  Programme design may require not merely working with 
service users, although that will be of pivotal importance, but also their families and carers, and the 
broader community.  Here, it should be recalled the particular emphasis African law places on family 
relationships.  While the service user owes responsibilities to his or her family under the African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, so responsibilities also flow from the family to the 
service user.  Such relationships, along with the particular social structures of African communities, 
should be considered in the development of community-based services; although it will also need to 
be considered how services are to be provided when these relationships break down. 
This is therefore clearly an area where non-statutory policy will play a significant, if not a primary 
role.  Statute law will also have a role, however, in providing legal form to services that are provided.  
If, for example, the decision is made to provide financial assistance to people who care for people 
  
14 
 
with mental disabilities, it is likely that this will need to be given legislative form, either in law 
relating to mental disability or, more probably, relating to social services.  Similarly, if there are 
specific community services that, in the view of the legislature, every citizen in need ought to have a 
right to, it may well be appropriate to include that right in a statute. 
The more interesting question is whether statute law has anything to bring to the process of 
realisation of these community-based rights.  The real issue regarding these rights is how to ensure 
that governments continue in the process of progressive realisation.  How is it to be assured that 
ongoing pragmatic reforms remain on the political and bureaucratic agenda?  One way to address 
this problem is to establish an independent body whose role is to monitor services of people with 
mental disabilities.  For this to work, the body needs sufficient independence from government to be 
and to be perceived as objective, and to have the expertise to command the respect of government, 
service users and health and social care professionals alike.  The body should publish periodic 
reports about progress towards the community services for people with mental disability.   
This is a good approach anywhere, but it may have particular importance for Africa.  Appropriate 
services will depend very much on the local culture and circumstances of a country.  While Africans 
are encouraged, of course, to learn lessons from community service provision in the rest of the 
world, African culture is likely to require African solutions.  While we are beginning to see ideas 
generated as to what these solutions might look like, it is too soon to offer definitive guidance.  The 
use of a national panel to further the right to live in the community and other similar rights subject 
to progressive realisation offers a good mechanism to encourage momentum towards these local 
solutions. 
Some African countries have panels of this sort in their law, but it does not seem that they have 
been brought into being in practice.  This is unfortunate, and emphasises the requirement for an 
implementation plan to be developed in tandem with statutory reform.  Certainly, such bodies do 
have some costs attached to them; but they will not be particularly expensive, even given the 
relatively limited health budgets of many African countries. 
Issues Surrounding Hospitalisation and Treatment in Hospital10 
The basic requirements concerning Involuntary Hospitalisation 
 
Not all people who are admitted to hospital for their mental disabilities will require involuntary 
hospitalisation (also called ‘detention’ or ‘compulsory hospitalisation’).  The trend internationally has 
for many years been away from formal legal detention, towards the right of service users to make 
their own decisions regarding hospital admission, treatment, and engagement with the health and 
social services systems in the same way that people admitted to hospital for non-psychiatric 
conditions do.  These voluntary patients have the right to leave the hospital, and to make their own 
treatment decisions, and a well-drawn mental health statute should make this clear.  When such 
patients wish to leave the hospital, most statutes currently do allow them to be formally detained 
there, when the relevant criteria are met.   
                                                          
10
 Issues in this section are discussed in greater detail in chapter 2 of the WHO Resource Book.   
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While it has long been good practice to move as far as possible to a situation where service users 
make their own decisions regarding hospital admission and treatment, the international norm prior 
to the CRPD was that compulsion is available in sufficiently severe circumstances, where the service 
user continues to refuse admission and treatment.  While the intentions of the staff members 
involved in these cases have no doubt generally been benevolent, the detention of a person in a 
mental health hospital is also very a significant intrusion into the private life and personal integrity of 
that individual, resulting in the deprivation of the individual’s liberty and, often, his or her treatment 
with very strong medication or electricity.  Unsurprisingly, service users often experience these 
admissions as violative. 
As a result, international law established both substantive and procedural requirements for 
compulsory hospital admission of people with mental disability.  A clear diagnosis of mental disorder 
was required, but that was not of itself enough:  the disorder had to be of sufficient severity that 
compulsory admission was demonstrably necessary.  Some flexibility was permitted to countries as 
to how this was defined – dangerousness to self or others, or suffering from a serious disorder that 
was amendable to psychiatric treatment, for example.  Procedural safeguards were also required, 
defining who would have the authority to enforce admission and according to what process, and 
providing the person admitted with a challenge to the admission before an independent judge or 
similar person.  All of these were viewed as classic liberty rights, and therefore subject to 
introduction with immediate effect. 
It is not yet clear what the effect of the CRPD will be regarding compulsory admission.  Article 14 
states that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’  but this does 
not necessarily mean, as some have claimed, that all laws which allow the forced admission of 
people to hospital on the basis of psychiatric conditions are now in violation of the CRPD.  The same 
part of article 14 states that deprivations of liberty must be ‘in accordance with the law’, suggesting 
that the position may be a good deal more complex than simply ‘no detention allowed’.  There are a 
variety of other possible interpretations of the Article: 
 It may be arguable that article 14 will be construed to mean that the existence of a disability in 
and of itself will not be sufficient to justify a deprivation of liberty.  If this is the case, it will mean 
that other factors (such as dangerousness or least restrictive alternative) will need to be shown 
in addition to mental disability prior to a compulsory admission.  This would result in a position 
very similar to the previously existing international law.  
 It is possible that some criteria may be construed as ‘disability neutral’.  Whether an individual 
has capacity to make the decision as to whether or not to enter hospital might be such a 
criterion, and if so, then its use as a gateway to enforced hospitalisation would be defensible 
under article 14.   
 It may also be arguable that the CRPD must be understood as a package of rights, with article 14 
rights coming into effect in parallel to the other rights in the CRPD.  Certainly, it is difficult to see 
that large scale de-institutionalisation is a good idea without the provision of community 
services for the people discharged. These other rights are, often, subject to progressive 
realisation, however.  If the rights are construed as a package, article 14 too becomes a right 
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subject to progressive realisation, in tandem with these other rights.  Mandatory hospitalisation 
would wane over time, as community services gained strength.  In the interim, the traditional 
international law relating to the right to liberty – law which is immediately realisable – would 
continue to apply.  
The possible readings of article 14 therefore range from no change to existing international law, to 
progressive realisation as formal detention is gradually removed, to an outright ban on compulsory 
psychiatric admissions.  It will be some time before we have clear answers on how Article 14 is to be 
understood, and in the interim at the very least the previously existing international law continues to 
apply, and as noted above, this law is not subject to progressive realisation, but must be introduced 
with immediate effect, and the remainder of this section focuses on those immediate requirements.  
Consistent with the introductory discussion in this chapter, good practice in this area considerably 
exceeds the minimum required by this international law.  In this subsection, the requirements 
required as a minimum by traditional international law will be identified; in the next section, 
additional comments will be made as to what constitutes good practice. 
In terms of process, the vital issue is that the service user who objects to his or her involuntary 
admission can have a prompt review of that admission by court, tribunal, or independent review 
board.  This must be a proper legal hearing, to determine both that the correct administrative 
processes were used and that the relevant criteria actually apply to the service user.  The court or 
tribunal must be independent of the hospital, and of everyone involved in the admission.  The 
service user must be able to present his or her case personally if he or she wishes to do so, and have 
a right to legal representation, although not necessarily at the expense of the state.  It is of vital 
importance however that the hearing constitute a proper review of the merits of the case, even 
when the person with mental disability is not represented and, sometimes, is not (by reason of 
disability or otherwise) able to present their case well.  This, again, is consistent with African judicial 
practice, where unrepresented litigants frequently appear, and where judges are nonetheless 
expected to ensure that their rights are properly protected.  The fact that the litigants have a mental 
disability, and the context of the case involves involuntary admission, does not change this 
fundamental approach. 
Many countries internationally choose to fulfil this role using a multi-disciplinary tribunal, typically 
including a lawyer or judge, a doctor or other medical expert, a lay person, and, sometimes, a service 
user.11  The advantage of such a review panel is that it can be constituted so that its members 
understand the somewhat technical nature of the evidence it will hear.  Its hearings can also be 
somewhat less formal than court hearings, and less intimidating for the service user.  This is thought 
to be a good approach, but it is not formally required by international law.  The regular court system 
may be used instead.  What will be key to making the system work however is implementation:  the 
decision-makers must treat their role seriously, rather than as a ‘rubber stamping’ exercise; and 
service users must be told about their right to challenge their admissions, and assisted in having 
their case heard when their circumstances require such assistance.  The people staffing the tribunal 
must be such as will attract the respect of both service users and professionals. 
                                                          
11
 The Mental Health Care Act 2002 (Republic of South Africa) uses this system, for example, albeit without a 
service user representative. 
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A review must be available the first time the service user requests it.  Because the treatment 
provided in the hospital should improve the service user’s condition, subsequent reviews must be 
available periodically, to determine whether the service user remains properly detained. 
The Act must also be clear as to how the admissions process will be administered.  What documents 
will be required for an admission?  What will the qualifications have to be for the people completing 
those documents?  Should people in the community (e.g., a police officer or a tribal chief) be able to 
start an admission process, and if so, what procedures and criteria will apply to these admissions?  
Many of these issues are discussed in detail in chapter 8.3.3 of the WHO Resource Book, and that 
discussion will not be repeated here.  Suffice it to say that the statute should consider what the 
pathways into care will be, who will be responsible for administering those pathways, what legal 
powers they will possess, what criteria they will use to exercise them, and how it will be ensured 
that they are using those powers properly and appropriately. 
Under the pre-CRPD international law, the criteria for the involuntary admission had to include a 
requirement that the individual is suffering from a mental disorder.  If this approach is followed, a 
medical assessment will be required as part of the admission process.  Ideally, this should be done 
by a medical doctor (indeed, in a truly ideal world, by a psychiatrist), but in many African countries 
the shortage of such staff may make that impractical.  The Republic of South Africa has avoided this 
problem by allowing such assessments also to be made by psychologists, nurses, occupational 
therapists and social workers, following appropriate training.   This approach will be successful, of 
course, only if appropriate training programmes are put in place, as part of the implementation 
strategy.   
In addition to the processes for involuntary admission, the law must be clear as to the criteria to be 
used for detention:  a person applying the law must be able to be reasonably sure whether the law 
applies or not in a given case.  Without such clarity, mandatory admission becomes a lottery, based 
on who does the relevant assessments.  According to international law prior to the CRPD, the 
individual had to be suffering from a mental disorder or intellectual disability.  This must be a ‘true’ 
disorder, recognised by medical science:  detentions based on spurious conditions for sake of 
convenience are something the rule of law in this area exists to avoid.  It does not follow that all 
mental disorders must be included in the criteria, however.  Some countries choose to exclude 
personality disorders, for example, or disorders related to alcohol or drug abuse.  The advantages 
and disadvantages of such exclusions are discussed in the WHO Resource Book at chapter 2.3. 
However mental disability is defined for purposes of involuntary admission, the mere presence of 
the disability will not be sufficient on its own to justify involuntary admission.  International law 
requires that in addition, criteria be adopted as to why the admission must occur.  The most usual 
criteria, discussed in the WHO Resource Book at section 2.8.3.2, are dangerousness and the need for 
treatment.  Either of these was acceptable in international law prior to the CRPD, either separately 
or in some conjoined form.  Recently, some countries have moved to a requirement that an 
individual have impaired decision-making capacity as part of their criteria for involuntary admission.  
This has the advantage of bringing psychiatric care more closely to the same footing as other forms 
of medical care - a desirable outcome.   
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Good Practice Issues Relating to Involuntary Hospitalisation 
 
While the above discussion indicates the minimum requirements of pre-CRPD international law, 
there are many more factors that may be considered by way of good practice, if they can be 
successfully implemented. 
As noted above, the traditional approach is that the admission process must include a medical 
assessment by a suitably qualified person.  Frequently, states require two such assessments.  In 
situations where the existence of a mental disorder is legitimately disputable or where the degree of 
the disorder is such that it is disputable whether it warrants confinement, this makes it more likely 
that the dispute will be identified and dealt with, and ensure that only those people who really need 
detention are in fact detained.  Sometimes statutes require the involvement of an individual other 
than a medical practitioner, such as a social worker.  This is also desirable, in that psychiatric 
detention is not just a medical issue, but a social and community one as well.  Particularly if the 
medical expert has not had prior acquaintance with the service user, or does not know the details of 
the cultural or community dynamics surrounding the service user, the involvement of someone from 
the local community in the process may make considerable sense to ensure that the admission is 
objectively justified, rather than an inappropriate community or family response to the individual. 
In practice, it will almost certainly be a good idea to limit the period of detention under the statute, 
allowing the detention to continue only after a re-assessment as to whether the detention criteria 
remain met.  It is good practice for health practitioners to keep the detention criteria in mind in any 
event, and to release the service user as soon as he or she no longer meets these criteria, but time-
limiting the detention certificates means that such re-assessment must in any event happen as a 
matter of routine, reducing the risk that people will through inadvertence remain in hospital longer 
than necessary.  Frequently, these re-assessments are co-ordinated with the right of the service user 
to require a new court/tribunal hearing into their detention, so that a service user may request one 
hearing in each of these periods.  Assuming the periods are reasonably short – say, a month for the 
first period and every six months thereafter – this is consistent with international law. 
As noted in the previous section, traditional international law requires only that a full hearing into 
the detention be available when the service user requests it.  Often, statutes will make provision for 
mandatory hearings on a periodic basis.  The WHO considers it best practice that such a hearing 
ought to occur as a matter of routine after the initial assessment and after each re-assessment.  This 
again is meant to be a way of ensuring that people are not left detained through inadvertence, but 
only when their condition actually requires it.  Other countries require the routine scrutiny of 
admissions certificates by an independent person, to ensure that they sufficiently make out the case 
for detention.  The advantage of these routine systems is that all cases of compulsion receive some 
scrutiny, a system that not only may identify problematic cases but will also put pressure on the 
admitting personnel to ensure that the criteria are followed properly.  The disadvantage is that the 
evidence would suggest that many of these hearings are highly routine, to the point where no 
meaningful enquiry is undertaken.   
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Until very recently, the right to a hearing extended only to situations where a service user was 
legally detained under a mental health statute.  More recently, we have started to see concerns 
raised about people admitted to psychiatric facilities in theory on a voluntary basis, but where they 
lack the ability to choose to be admitted.  Usually, these people will not be allowed out of the 
hospital unescorted, and they are in effect detained, but because they do not actively object to their 
hospitalisation, they are not formally detained.  As they lack the ability to decide about their 
hospitalisation, they are extremely unlikely to request any sort of enquiry or court assessment of 
their situation.  Some statutes introduce particular safeguards such as routine reviews of admission 
for these service users, to ensure that hospitalisation really is necessary and appropriate for them. 
Once again, it is appropriate to recall that the CRPD remains the unknown factor in all this 
discussion.  It is not yet clear precisely what it will require by way of criteria or processes. 
Procedural safeguards on Treatment of Service Users in Hospital 
 
The ‘hard line’ of international law, as distinct from good international practice, requires that 
psychiatric treatment is neither cruel nor inhuman nor degrading.  These are themselves somewhat 
indistinct concepts, but a few indicators may be helpful.  Most medical treatments have adverse 
effects as well as good effects, so the fact that a treatment may be unpleasant does not of itself 
render it cruel, inhuman or degrading.  At some point, however, when the benefits of treatment are 
outweighed by adverse effects – particularly when those effects involve pain, ongoing or permanent 
harm, or disability – questions of whether the treatment is cruel, inhuman or degrading will arise.  
Consistent with this, treatment in psychiatric hospitals must have a therapeutic purpose; if it does 
not, it is very likely to be found to be inhuman or degrading.  A possible exception to this rule is 
when the treatment is for restraint of the patient, in circumstances where that restraint is 
demonstrably necessary and the provision of the medication is the least intrusive way of affecting 
the restraint.  As noted elsewhere, the general move internationally is to favour the rights of 
patients to make choices, and it may well be the case that treatments to which a patient with 
decision-making capacity does not consent will be more likely to scrutinised by international courts 
with particular care.  While there are strong movements that treatment in psychiatric facilities ought 
to be closely monitored and governed, particularly for detained patients, it cannot – or at least could 
not prior to the CRPD - be said that there is a right in international law of a capable detained patient 
to refuse psychiatric treatment that is considered by his or her clinical team to be therapeutically 
necessary.  This may, however, be an early challenge under the CRPD, which provides that treatment 
may not be provided to individuals except ‘on the basis of free and informed consent’.12  If such a 
challenge were successful (and the case seems strong), treatment without consent would become 
illegal in international law, even for people detained in psychiatric hospitals. 
There are, in practice, a number of specific treatments that have been considered internationally to 
be sufficiently intrusive to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.13  Examples include electro-
convulsive therapy without the use of muscle relaxants and anaesthesia, sterilisation, and 
                                                          
12
 Article 25(d). 
13
 These are discussed in the resource book at section 2.10.   
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operations directly on the brain to affect psychiatric behaviour, such as psychosurgery and 
lobotomy. 
International law also provides people in hospitals, like the rest of the population, with the right to 
the best attainable standard of health, including both physical and mental health care.  This will be 
discussed at more length above regarding the provision of health services in the community; suffice 
it here to say that those remarks apply equally to the provision of services in institutional settings 
such as hospitals, and equally to physical and psychiatric treatments in those settings.  Too 
frequently, standards of health care inside these facilities are markedly worse than those in 
communities; this raises the possibility of a challenge under the right to health. 
As noted, the emphasis internationally is on community alternatives to hospitalisation, and for all 
hospital inpatients, the overarching objective should be to place them as expeditiously as possible 
into a position where they can be discharged back into the community.  To this end, an 
individualised treatment plan should be developed in consultation with the service user.  Discharge 
planning should commence well in advance of the actual discharge, and should involve not merely 
the service user but also, with the service user’s consent, key people such as family in the 
community where the service user will live following discharge. 
It is further good practice to provide procedural safeguards prior to the treatment of inpatients, and 
involuntary inpatients in particular.  The Resource Book provides a range of possibilities in this 
regard.  It quite rightly emphasises that treatment should be overseen by a qualified medical 
practitioner.  As was the case regarding hospital detentions, there is an issue in an African context as 
to which professionals should be authorised to do what in a treatment context.  It may be 
appropriate to insist that treatment plans be reviewed by a tribunal or an independent expert prior 
to the enforcement of long-term treatment.  Formal periodic reviews of involuntary treatment can 
(and where possible should) be required, to ensure that such treatments do not last longer than is 
necessary. 
Frequently, statutes have provided additional criteria that must be fulfilled if a detained patient is to 
be treated without consent.  Sometimes, whether or not the service user has decision-making 
capacity will be relevant to determining whether such treatment can occur, and make it much more 
difficult (or occasionally impossible) if a capable service user declines proposed treatment.  Whether 
such options remain possible will of course depend on how Article 25 of the CRPD is read.  If this 
article is found to preclude the involuntary treatment of a capable patient, the statute would need 
to reflect that.  In that event, however, the additional safeguards might still make sense for the 
treatment of people who were unable to consent because of a lack of decision-making capacity.14 It 
might for example be required that treatment for such persons can only be given if it is likely to 
improve the service user’s condition to the point where he or she will able to be released, or will no 
longer be dangerous as a result of his or her mental disorder.  Alternatively, it might be thought 
sufficient that the treatment would be likely to result in a marked reduction in the manifestations of 
the mental disorder.   
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 Decision-making capacity is discussed further below. 
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Many countries introduce particular safeguards for particular treatments when those treatments are 
thought to be particularly intrusive.  Thus when psychosurgery is not completely banned, it is often 
subject to particular restrictions.  Electro-convulsive therapy, even when performed with 
anaesthesia and muscle relaxants, is also often subject to particular restrictions.  Sometimes 
treatments that affect the sex drive, or treatments lasting longer than a specific period, are subject 
to particular scrutiny.  Often the provisions related to these specific treatments are based 
substantively on one or more of the criteria in the last paragraph.  Often they also require an order 
by an independent authority who is removed from the immediate situation, such as a judge or 
review tribunal.  
Treatment of informal inpatients 
 
There is an international consensus that inpatients not subject to involuntary psychiatric admission 
retain their right to consent to or refuse treatment, often subject to a capacity test relating to the 
service user’s ability to make the treatment decision.  As noted elsewhere in this report, however, 
such apparently ‘voluntary’ decisions are often experienced by the service user as having a 
considerable degree of compulsion attached.  As a particularly clear example, it is sometimes the 
case that that the threat of involuntary admission is used to induce ‘voluntary’ consent to psychiatric 
treatment from previously non-detained patients who would not consent otherwise.  There is 
concern that this may often constitute an abuse:  if service users have consented to be in the 
institution, they presumably understand the problems their mental disorder poses.  In that event, 
the view would be that it should be possible to work with these people co-operatively, rather than 
resort to legal force for purposes of compelling the medication.   
A slightly different area of concern involves service users who lack capacity to consent to treatment 
in systems where such people may be treated without consent.  Here the concern is not merely that 
there is no choice by the service user; it is also that there may be no mechanism to ensure the 
ongoing appropriateness of the treatment. 
For these reasons, some countries have chosen to extend administrative protections relating to 
treatment provision to include non-detained patients, analogous to those for detained patients.  
Such an approach is really a way to ensure appropriate service provision in the hospital – it is a 
quality check.  As such, it could be done for all patients, but it may also be sufficiently effective if it is 
done for a random sample of patients, with much more comprehensive evaluations performed if the 
sample shows up problems.  
Issues surrounding standards of care in Psychiatric Hospitals and 
Residential Institutions 
 
Once again, international law imposes a firm minimum standard, that care provided in hospitals and 
residential institutions not be cruel, inhuman or degrading.  As was the case when the same 
concepts were raised in the context of treatment, the scope of the phrase ‘cruel, inhuman or 
degrading’ is not entirely rigid, and much will depend on the facts of a given case upon which the 
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international court is called upon to adjudicate.  Nonetheless, some baseline requirements and 
guidance may be helpful. 
Certainly, the basic conditions of life must be satisfied.  This means that adequate food, clothing and 
shelter must be provided.  Where the winter gets cold, adequate heat must be provided to ensure 
reasonable comfort in the day rooms and bedrooms of the institution.  Systems must be in place to 
ensure that people are safe from violence from other service users, and violence from staff is of 
course unacceptable.  Adequate space must be provided within the facility, both in day rooms and 
bedrooms, and there must be opportunity for exercise, and at reasonable access to the outdoors.  
Reasonable things to do must be provided for service users to relieve the tedium of institutional life.  
Appropriate healthcare must be provided for both physical and psychiatric complaints. International 
law does not prohibit seclusion or restraint, including the use of tranquillising medications,  but it 
does require that these be closely controlled, used only in cases of clear necessity and for the 
briefest time possible, and where they are the least restrictive response possible. 
The service users must also be able to maintain reasonable contact with the world outside the 
institution.  This is clearest in terms of ensuring contact with their children, spouse, and other family 
members.   
It is the obligation of the state to ensure that these standards of care are enforced.  In practice, this 
is likely to mean that the state must organise periodic independent inspections of its hospitals and 
residential care institutions to ensure that these standards are being met.15  Quite how this is done 
will be a matter largely for the individual state.  It is to be recognised that in most African countries, 
there are relatively few hospitals or residential homes to which people with mental disabilities are 
admitted, and it may seem excessive to establish an inspection panel for such few institutions.  In 
that event, it may be possible to conjoin the role of these inspectors with a similar inspection 
mechanism for other hospitals or for prisons, if those inspectorates already exist.  In that event, 
however, it should be noted that particular issues arise regarding institutions for people with mental 
disabilities, and the composition and expertise of those inspectorates would have to be amended 
accordingly.  Alternatively, if (as will be discussed below) an independent national body is 
established to foster the improvement of mental health service provision generally, inspection could 
be included within its mandate. 
It is fair to ask how much of the material in this subsection belongs in a statute, and how much in 
policy or other guidance.  For the substantive material, inclusion or not in a statute will not affect 
whether the care provided constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment:  either the care 
meets the international requirements or it does not, and pointing to statutory provisions will not 
change that.  Procedures regarding restraint and seclusion will almost certainly need to be written 
down, but it is not obvious that this needs to be in a statute, rather than in a procedure within the 
institution itself.    
                                                          
15
 A useful guide to inspection services is Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC), Inspect! (Budapest:  
MDAC, 2006).  Copies are available online at http://www.mdac.info/en/reports. 
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There are some things that will probably need to be contained in a statute, however.  The 
mechanism for inspection will need to be created by statute, for example.  Further, it should be 
remembered that law has a symbolic as well as a practical role, and inclusion of standards of service 
provision in a statute can give them a primacy that they would not otherwise have, in turn increasing 
the likelihood that they will be realised.  If this would be the case regarding standards of care, it may 
well be worth referring to them in the statute. 
Once again, the material identified above is a minimum, and it is to be hoped that certainly over 
time, services in African countries will be of a significantly higher standard.  This is in part about 
service provision in the institution itself. It is to be hoped for example that the occupation provided 
for service users will include practical training in skills that will be useful for community living, not 
merely diversions to limit the tedium of institutional life.  How specific services develop will be 
determined in individual countries and subject to local conditions, as well as subject to ongoing 
developments in health science and the community services into which institutional services should 
increasingly integrate.  Certainly, such higher provision is a good thing, and indeed, must be taken 
seriously by national governments as part of their obligation to provide the best attainable standard 
of health.  At this point the discussion merges with the discussion below on that topic.  
Issues surrounding the Right to Make Decisions and Mental Capacity 
 
International law is replete with provisions of various sorts, providing all people with access to 
courts, the right to own property, and the right to personal integrity (which, by extension, must 
include the right to make basic decisions about oneself and one’s life).  These can be coupled and to 
a significant degree limited however with legal provisions to determine decision-making capacity.  In 
many African countries, the legal provisions in the existing statutes are inflexible:  decision-making 
capacity is an ‘all or nothing’ matter that may deprive people of decision-making powers even in 
areas where they still have capacity; and capacity is re-assessed rarely if at all.  In these systems, the 
person found to be lacking capacity is subjected to vastly reduced legal rights, and often deprived of 
any meaningful involvement in the management of their lives and property.  These restrictions are 
often imposed on the basis of minimal evidence, and minimal process.  Indeed, it would seem that 
frequently within Africa, these deprivations of rights occur based on social convention or other 
informal mechanisms rather than on formal legal process. 
Increasingly, these antiquated systems of guardianship are being subject to challenge under 
international law.  It is still too early to provide a definitive statement about what will be required as 
a matter of ‘hard’ international law, and what will be merely international good practice, but Article 
12 of the CRPD make it clear that a new approach will be required.  It is based on a view that society 
has failed adequately to provide sufficient practical supports to allow people with disabilities to 
make the decisions those which they are in fact competent to make.  Old ‘all or nothing’ schemes of 
guardianship are therefore virtually certain to fall afoul of the CRPD; much more sensitive legal 
mechanisms, coupled with systems to support people with mental disabilities in their decision-
making, will be required. 
It might be helpful to present the following pointers and principles guiding mental capacity law: 
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 The mere presence of a mental health problem does not in itself imply incapacity to make 
decisions and is therefore not the sole basis upon which decisions about incapacity should be 
made.  Sometimes the nature and severity of a mental disability will be relevant to the 
determination of capacity to make a decision, but many people, even with severe mental 
disabilities, remain able to make some or all decisions relevant to their lives.  
 Capacity instead refers to the ability of the individual to understand and process information 
regarding to the specific decision or decisions which is/are at issue in the capacity 
determination.   
 Capacity or incapacity should be determined according to the specific decisions an individual is 
called upon to make, and intervention should affect only those decisions the individual is unable 
to make.  ‘Partial guardianship’ is to be preferred to ‘plenary guardianship’ unless the latter is 
demonstrably necessary.  An individual’s right to make all decisions should thus only be removed 
if it can be demonstrated that he or she lacks capacity to make all decisions.   
 In law, there is a presumption of capacity.  As a question of onus of proof, it is on the person 
alleging incapacity to be able to demonstrate incapacity.  That said, wilful blindness to incapacity 
is not acceptable:  capacity should not be assumed in law in the face of manifest evidence to the 
contrary.  
 All reasonable steps should be taken to assist people to make capable decisions.  These may 
include using simple language, using language understood by the individual, and repeating 
information as required.  This right to supported decision-making is expressly provided in Article 
12(3) of the CRPD.  
 Incapacity is not synonymous with making a bad decision, or making an eccentric decision.  It 
certainly does not result merely because a vulnerable person disagrees with his or her doctor or 
other carer.  It is about whether the individual has sufficient understanding and ability to reach a 
decision warranting respect (see further discussion below).  
 Incapacity is not the same as a loss of trust between an individual and his or her carers.  The fact 
that an individual declines to follow medical or other advice does not mean that the person is 
unable to understand and make decisions based on that advice.  
 Stereotyping is not permitted in assessing capacity.  Just because a person is old, or intellectually 
disabled, or has a mental illness, it does not follow that he or she lacks capacity.   
 The finding that an individual lacks capacity to make a decision, any appointment of a substitute 
decision-maker, and how any substitute decision-making power is exercised should all be 
reviewed on a regular basis.  The initial finding of incapacity should not mean that the individual 
disappears into the system, unsupervised, for long periods of time.  
 
Essentially, the objective is to leave the person with mental disabilities with as much control over his 
or her own life as is consistent with his or her actual abilities.  Article 12(4) of the CRPD requires that 
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any restriction of rights in this regard must be tailored to the needs of each individual service user.  
The CRPD thus precludes the removal of any decision-making authority without evidence of 
incapacity related to that specific decision or set of decisions.  Wholesale removal of decision-
making authority such has existed in many countries in the past will almost certainly be found to be 
in violation of this article.  Similarly, aspects of law which remove rights as the result of being placed 
under a guardianship order will almost certainly be found in contravention of the article.  Thus some 
countries automatically preclude people who are under guardianship from voting or being 
employed, for example; such automatic provisions are almost certainly in violation of the CRPD. 
The system of capacity determination will be relevant for some decisions relating to people in 
psychiatric hospitals.  For example, while mental health laws often allow treatment of detained 
patients for mental disorders without their consent, they do not allow for treatment of physical 
disorders on similar terms:  treatment for a broken leg may only be given to a competent detained 
patient if that patient consents to the treatment.  People in hospitals may also own property, and 
while measures may need to be put in place to ensure that the property is properly cared for during 
hospitalisation, hospitalisation itself does not mean the service user should lose his or her rights and 
control over it.  Nonetheless, and different to the issues discussed so far in this chapter, issues 
relating to capacity are also of relevance (perhaps, indeed, greater relevance?) to service users living 
in the community. 
This in turn means that the process to instigate and implement capacity determinations must be 
available throughout the state.  It seems likely that international law will require that these 
determinations must be time-limited (with the possibility of renewal following relevant process in 
the event that incapacity continues), based on cogent evidence of incapacity to make the decisions 
in question, and made by a judge or similar figure who is independent of the parties.  Once again, 
there will be the question of who should be considered qualified to give medical evidence relating to 
any mental condition that affects capacity.  In most African countries, it is unlikely to be practical 
that this be a psychiatrist or, often, even a medical doctor.  That said, it is important that any 
medical evidence relating to incapacity be of a reasonable standard, suggesting some training in 
diagnostics will be necessary for this purpose.   This is a similar problem as that discussed above as 
to whom should make the medical assessments prior to hospital detentions, and it may, perhaps, be 
appropriate to use the same medical experts for both purposes. 
The existing African systems of guardianship and capacity determination tend to involve an 
application to the High Court, which often means travelling to the national capital or another major 
urban centre, sometimes far removed from the service user’s community.  Usually, such applications 
require the services of a lawyer.  Thus for reasons both of geography and expense, the existing 
processes will be out of reach of all but a small minority of society.  This is a matter that must be 
considered in the design of a new system.  If it is to be practical for cases to be re-considered on, say, 
a six-monthly or even annual basis, the hearings must happen near to the service user’s home; and 
they must be designed to ensure that determination of capacity does not require a lawyer.  At the 
same time, the judges making the orders must be sufficiently experienced in the law as it is passed 
that good decisions will result.  Quite how this will work will depend on the geography and the court 
structure of the relevant country.   
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Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System 
 
Issues relating to people with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system are considered in the 
WHO Resource Book at chapter 2.15, and that discussion will not be repeated here.  At the same 
time, the subject is of sufficient importance both in general and as a specific issue for statutory 
governance that it cannot be ignored. 
There are four points at which issues of mental disorder may become relevant in the criminal 
process.  The first is before trial, where the issue is likely to be whether the individual ought to be 
dealt with under the criminal process, or instead under the non-criminal law discussed earlier in this 
paper.  The second is at trial, where the issues are likely to be whether the individual is ‘fit to plead’ 
(that is, able to participate in the trial at all), and if so, whether the individual’s mental illness or 
mental disability at the time of the offence was such that he (or she) should not be held criminally 
responsible for the act.  The third is following trial, where the issue will be whether, even if 
convicted of a criminal offence, an individual with a mental disability should be sent to a psychiatric 
institution rather than a prison.  The fourth occurs during the serving of a sentence in prison:  in the 
event that the inmate develops mental health problems, should the inmate be moved to a 
psychiatric facility.   
A number of the issues discussed in previous sections regarding the detention of people with mental 
disabilities outside the criminal law and the standards of care provided in psychiatric hospitals 
remain relevant for people detained under the criminal process.  In particular, some aspects of the 
system (e.g., fitness to plead and criminal responsibility at the time of the offence) can be 
understood as specific applications of capacity law.  The issues in that discussion above should 
therefore be recalled. 
The fundamental point in terms of international law concerning people with mental disabilities in 
the criminal system is that the issues closely mirror those in the non-criminal system.  Thus the 
discussion of standards of care in psychiatric facilities earlier in this chapter will continue to apply:  
people admitted through the criminal system must not be subject to inhuman or degrading 
treatment, and continue to be entitled to the right to health for both their physical and their 
psychiatric problems.  Service users in the criminal system do not, under international law, need to 
be kept in the same institutions as people in the civil system; but the buildings in which they are kept 
must meet humane standards of care.   
Routine re-assessments of service users detained in the criminal psychiatric system must occur, to 
ensure that the service user’s mental health condition still warrants detention in the psychiatric 
criminal institution.  Hearings before a court or independent tribunal to challenge findings of those 
assessments if requested by the service user.  This appears to be a particular problem in some 
African countries, where people considered unfit to plead are kept in psychiatric institutions well 
after their fitness is restored.  The African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights includes the 
right to have ones cause heard by a court; if an individual is no longer unfit to plead, he or she must 
be returned to the criminal court for a disposition of the charges at issue.   
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It is further highly likely that continued detention of people in the criminal psychiatric system when 
they are no longer in need of treatment will also be in violation of international law.  While such 
people may be returned to prison to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence, they should 
not be kept in a psychiatric environment unless such an environment is demonstrably necessary. 
In some countries, even when an individual is found unfit to plead, a hearing is held to test the 
strength of the prosecutor’s case.  The argument here is that if the accused would clearly have been 
acquitted, he or she should not be in the criminal mental health system, notwithstanding his or her 
mental illness.  Thus only if the prosecutor’s case has sufficient strength is the unfit to plead verdict 
entered; otherwise, the person may still be dealt with under the civil system in appropriate 
circumstances, but not under the criminal mental health system.  It should be noted that this 
process is not the same as a trial; if the person becomes fit to plead, he or she then proceeds to trial 
as anyone else would. It is instead a mechanism to ensure that people who would not have been 
convicted if they had capacity do not spend potentially long periods of time in the criminal mental 
health system.  
Sources and Drafting Procedures 
 
Chapter 3 of the WHO Resource Book concerns helpful advice about the processes of mental health 
law reform, and the purpose of this section is not to repeat that discussion.  Instead, the intent is to 
consider some of the issues that may arise in a specifically African context. 
As noted in the introductory chapter of this report, issues surrounding mental health law may often 
be new to the political, social and legal discussions in African countries.  Often, the relevant statute 
remains the one inherited from colonial administrations, and often even that law is not 
implemented.  Certainly, medical professionals have been providing care to service users, but they 
have generally not viewed this care as having much to do with law.  Legislative drafters and 
government lawyers have not been called upon to be involved in issues relating to mental disability.  
For all, many of the issues discussed in this report and in the WHO Resource Book will be new.  As 
the discussion in this report shows, those issues are complicated, requiring considerable background 
to reach good decisions about the direction of law and policy. 
This will have an effect on law reform and drafting procedures.  The WHO Resource Book divides the 
process of law reform into four categories:  preliminary activities, legislative drafting, adoption of 
legislation, and implementation of legislation.  While this makes analytic sense, it contains the risk 
that these stages will be seen as separate.  This may be reflected in the fact that, while a number of 
African nations have successfully developed draft legislation, notably fewer have seen that 
legislation passed (or passed in the form it was originally drafted), and fewer still have seen proper 
implementation.  There are no doubt many reasons for this, but one may well be that a number of 
the people in charge of seeing the draft legislation through the legislature or costing the 
implementation have not necessarily been involved in the discussions during the drafting process.  
The risk in this situation is that they respond by giving the draft legislation low priority, and nothing 
ever really happens. 
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It may therefore be helpful to think of the processes of law reform as integrated or at least closely 
related, rather than focussing on the four steps noted above.  It will almost certainly be helpful to 
include people who will be involved in all four steps of the reform process in the discussions as draft 
legislation develops, so they will understand how the decisions related to that legislation were 
reached.  Without this knowledge and involvement, when a statute comes to implementation, the 
treasury official asked to approve the relevant budget is unlikely to understand the significance of 
the various expenses requested.  Involvement of these people in the ongoing process also means a 
better sense of what is attainable can be incorporated into the statute.  If it is clear that an aspect 
will not be implemented, e.g. for financial reasons, a different approach may be able to be adopted 
at the drafting stage following a reasoned discussion of what the best result will be for the money 
available. 
It will also be of importance to involve the person who will be drafting the legislation in the 
substantive discussions relating to the law reform.  The drafter may have considerable experience, 
but as will be clear from the preceding discussion, this is a technical area of law, and the drafter is 
unlikely to have had any experience in this area.  The drafter should remember that (unlike the 
situation for some commercial law, for example) the people who will be administering mental 
disability law will not be experts in law, nor will they have routine access to lawyers.  It is therefore 
important that the key sections of the law – things like the detention criteria and processes – are in 
language that intelligent non-lawyers can understand.  Failure to do this will mean that the people 
applying the law will not understand its terms; in those circumstances the law will not be properly 
applied, and the whole reform process becomes of doubtful value. 
Certainly, the discussions that form the basis of mental health law reform should extend well beyond 
service providers (although they should, of course, also be included).  As the reform process will 
involve statutory drafting, the establishment of administrative structures, and restrictions on the 
rights of people with mental disabilities, lawyers with knowledge of the national constitution and 
legal system should be included.  They may have different sense from service providers as to what 
may systems may be effective and appropriate in a given country.   
Service users must also be involved in the discussion as full participants.  While this group is 
sometimes overlooked, experience elsewhere has proven that they provide a different and 
important view of how services work, and what services are wanted.  What was once merely good 
practice is now a matter of international law:  article 4(3) of the CRPD requires that countries ‘closely 
consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, 
through their representative organizations’ in the development of law and policy related to 
disability.  It is thus not merely individuals with mental disability that must be involved, but also the 
civil society organisations formed by people with mental disability. 
The people involved in the reform project will thus have different backgrounds and experience to 
bring to the table; no one will have a good sense of all the issues.  The law reform process will thus 
inevitably involve developments in understanding of all parties, as they are exposed to the areas of 
knowledge of others.  This itself is significant, as it builds a firmer human foundation for mental 
disability law and policy to build upon. 
  
29 
 
As a basis for the discussions themselves, in addition to the notes above, reformers will want to 
consider the relevant international treaties, conventions, principles and good practice guides, 
including of course the CRPD.  A number of these are discussed in chapters 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 of the 
WHO resource book.  Most of these focus on human rights standards, both requiring that incursions 
into liberty must be justified, and encouraging legislation to promote the best available standard of 
health.   That said, a number of the instruments are specific to mental health/mental disability 
legislation.  These include : 
 UN Mental Illness Principles (contained as Annexe 3 to the WHO Resource Book) 
 The Declaration of Caracas (contained as Annexe 4 to the WHO Resource Book) 
 The Declaration of Madrid (contained as Annexe 5 to the WHO Resource Book) 
 The WHO Ten Basic Principles (contained on p 15 of the WHO Resource Book) 
 The Salamanca Statement and Framework For Action on Special Needs Education (referred to on 
p 16 of the WHO Resource Book) 
While these instruments may be helpful in providing an indication of the sorts of language and detail 
that statutes in this area should include, they must also be approached with come care.  They all pre-
date the CRPD, which, as noted throughout this report, has considerably changed the legislative 
landscape, and the effects of the CRPD on them should be considered with care when they are used. 
The real risk is that the discussions will become swamped with detail, and lose track of the overall 
picture.  While the detail must be settled in the reform process, that detail must be built on a 
consistent and firm understanding of the overarching principles and approaches to mental disability 
law.  This report is in part intended to assist with that difficulty, by focussing with limited detail on 
key themes that legislation must address.  Particularly as those involved in the reform discussions 
become more acclimatised to the issues, a few other tips and sources may help: 
 The WHO 10 Basic Principles (see WHO Resource Book, p. 15) encapsulate a good deal of 
wisdom in a short space.  Return to them often.  
 As discussed above, the amendments to the law should be part of an overall revision of mental 
health policy.  Keep the policy in mind, as a guide to the directions the law should take.  
 Try not to get too complicated. Remember that the statute will be implemented by people who 
are not legally trained.  They need to be able to understand what you write.  
 As discussed above, not everything needs to be in one statute (and some things may well be 
much more effective if placed in other statutes).  That said, keep a list as you go of things outside 
the main statute that you also want changed.   
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